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COMPUTING PRODUCTIVITY: FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE
Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin M. Hitt*
Abstract—We explore the effect of computerization on productivity and
output growth using data from 527 large U.S. firms over 1987–1994. We
find that computerization makes a contribution to measured productivity
and output growth in the short term (using 1-year differences) that is
consistent with normal returns to computer investments. However, the
productivity and output contributions associated with computerization are
up to 5 times greater over long periods (using 5- to 7-year differences).
The results suggest that the observed contribution of computerization is
accompanied by relatively large and time-consuming investments in
complementary inputs, such as organizational capital, that may be omitted
in conventional calculations of productivity. The large long-run contribu-
tion of computers and their associated complements that we uncover may
partially explain the subsequent investment surge in computers in the late
1990s.
I. Introduction
In advanced economies, productivity growth depends bothon technological innovation and on the organizational
changes enabled by technological innovation. The increas-
ing computerization of most businesses is a case in point.
Rapid technological innovation in the computer industry has
led to a quality-adjusted price decline of 20% or more per
year for several decades (Berndt and Griliches, 1990; Gor-
don, 1999), and these declines are likely to continue for the
foreseeable future. Meanwhile, nominal investment in com-
puters has increased even in the face of precipitous price
declines, reflecting the myriad new uses that have been
found for computers and related technologies. In recent
years, companies have implemented thousands of large and
small innovations in software applications, work processes,
business organization, supply-chain management, and cus-
tomer relationship management. Research using a growth
accounting approach has documented that rapidly rising
computer investment in the United States has contributed
significantly to output growth, especially in the late 1990s
(Oliner and Sichel, 2000; Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000). Yet
the computerization of firms involves far more than merely
their investment in computers.
In this paper, we build on previous research on the growth
contribution of computerization, exploiting the advantages
of measurements at the firm level. Panel data on outputs and
inputs (including computers) are available for large num-
bers of firms, enabling the use of econometric techniques to
estimate the contribution of computerization to several mea-
sures of multifactor productivity growth. In addition, firm
heterogeneity may be used to obtain a more accurate esti-
mate of the true contribution of computerization, especially
where these contributions are in the form of intangible
benefits (such as quality, variety, or convenience), which are
often poorly measured in output statistics (see a formal
treatment of this in appendix B and section II). Furthermore,
firm-level data enable us to understand the private returns of
computerization that ultimately drive decisions by managers
to invest in the first place.
Our focus on the firm level also enables us to investigate
the process by which computerization contributes to multi-
factor productivity growth. Computers are best described as
a general-purpose technology whose primary contribution is
to make new production methods possible when combined
with complementary investments such as new work sys-
tems, organizational redesign, and business process reengi-
neering (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Malone & Rockart,
1991; Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995; Greenwood & Jo-
vanovic, 1998; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, & Hitt, 2002).
These changes, in turn, yield substantial productivity im-
provements and perhaps even structural changes in the
economy over longer periods of time (David, 1990; Green-
span, 1997; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000).
Indeed, the business and academic literature on comput-
erization emphasizes the importance of large and small
complementary changes, including changes in business pro-
cesses, organization structure, and innovations in customer
and supplier relations.1 These changes can be thought of as
complementary investments in organizational capital that
may be up to 10 times as large as the direct investments in
computers (Brynjolfsson & Yang, 1999; Brynjolfsson, Hitt,
& Yang, 2002). Because these complementary investments
take time, a testable implication of this argument is that the
long-run benefits of computerization should exceed the
short-run contribution. These additional benefits from com-
puterization arise as firms implement complementary
changes in the rest of the business. Therefore, the resulting
effects of computerization on output may be greater than the
factor share of computer capital. We can exploit our panel
data to test for this relationship by varying the time horizon
over which we calculate input and output growth.
A number of previous studies have found a positive
relationship between IT investment and firm productivity
levels (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1995, 1996b; Lichtenberg,
1995). These studies used production-function estimates
and found that output elasticities for computers significantly
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exceed their capital costs.2 However, no previous economet-
ric study on computers and productivity at the firm level has
examined multifactor productivity growth, most likely on
account of data limitations.
In this paper, we apply standard growth accounting and
productivity measurement approaches to examine the rela-
tionship between growth in computer spending and growth
in output and multifactor productivity for 527 large firms
over 1987–1994. Our results suggest that over short hori-
zons (such as 1 year), estimated contributions of computers
are roughly equal to their costs—they contribute to output
growth but not productivity growth. However, as the time
horizon increases (increasing the difference length used in
the growth calculation), the contribution rises substantially
above capital costs, suggesting that computerization in the
long run contributes to multifactor productivity (MFP)
growth as conventionally measured.
The quantitative results are consistent with qualitative
arguments that computers complement other long-term
productivity-enhancing investments, including innovations
in business methods and organization, which are carried out
over a period of several years. Without a direct measure of
the cost and timing of complementary investments, we
cannot determine whether correlations between computers
and MFP represent a true correlation with MFP growth (if
the complements were appropriately included) or simply an
equilibrium return on a system of investments of computers
and their complements. Nonetheless, they do suggest that
computers are related to a broader set of assets and that the
long-run contribution of computerization to growth is po-
tentially much larger than would be expected from the
quantity of direct investment in computer capital.
We provide further background on our theoretical frame-
work in section II and present the basic models and data in
section III. Section IV presents the results using a variety of
specifications, section V discusses the main explanations for
the findings, and in section VI we conclude with a brief
summary and some implications.
II. Background: The Growth Contribution of
Computerization
A. Changes in the Production Process in Unmeasured
Inputs
Computers are primarily an investment good, so their
effect on economic welfare depends on how successfully
they support the production of other goods and services.
Companies have substantially increased both nominal and
real investments in computers over time, and this trend
accelerated further in the 1990s. Presumably, companies
perceive that exploiting these new technologies will result
in a significant potential increase in profits. In part, this
trend reflects the substitution of computers for labor or other
types of capital along a given production possibility frontier
for computer consumers. Users of ever cheaper computer
equipment can thereby achieve greater output for a given
cost of inputs. However, after properly allowing for the
deflation of computer prices, this type of substitution-driven
output growth reflects investment growth, not necessarily
multifactor productivity growth by computer users (Jorgen-
son & Stiroh, 1995; Stiroh, 2002). Nonetheless, the welfare
effects ascribed to the decline in computer prices (due to
productivity growth by computer producers) have amounted
to a sizable fraction of recent output growth in the United
States (Brynjolfsson, 1996; Jorgenson & Stiroh, 1995, 2000;
Oliner & Sichel, 2000).
Computers may affect the multifactor productivity
growth of the firms that use them by changing the produc-
tion process itself and engendering complementary innova-
tions within and among firms—the act of computerizing a
business process or collection of processes. Rather than
merely substituting a cheaper input (e.g., computers) for
another input (e.g., labor) in the context of a fixed produc-
tion process, companies can combine computers with other
innovations to fundamentally change their production pro-
cesses. This could lead to an output elasticity that is greater
than computers’ input share and to the appearance of excess
returns on computer capital stock. Viewed another way, the
complementary innovations can themselves be thought of as
a kind of input, or organizational capital (Brynjolfsson et al.,
2002). In this interpretation, the presence of seemingly
excess returns to computers, especially in the long run, may
suggest the presence of unmeasured complementary factors
and provide some indication of their output-growth benefits.
Although there is substantial case evidence of a wide variety
of these complementary factors, including human capital
(Murnane, Levy, & Autor, 1999), internal firm organization
(Bresnahan et al., 2002; Davenport & Short, 1990; Or-
likowski, 1992), and supply chain management systems
(Short and Venkatramen, 1992), few studies have consid-
ered the broader economic implications of these factors or
measured their presence.
2 In contrast, previous research at the industry level has been relatively
inconclusive. Morrison (1997) found a zero or even negative correlation
between computers and productivity; Siegel (1997) found a positive
relationship after correcting for measurement error in input and output
quantity. Other studies showing mixed results in industry data include
Berndt, Morrison, and Rosenblum (1992), Berndt and Morrison (1995),
Morrison and Berndt (1990), and Siegel and Griliches (1991). Even
studies which simply assume that computers were earning a normal rate of
return have come to contrasting conclusions about what this implies for
their overall contribution to economic growth. See Lau and Tokutsu
(1992), Jorgenson and Stiroh (1995), Bresnahan (1986), Brynjolfsson
(1996), and Oliner and Sichel (1994). More recently, Oliner and Sichel
(2000) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) concluded that computers were a
major contributor to the productivity revival in the late 1990s, and Gordon
(2000) emphasized the role of other factors. Brynjolfsson (1993), Bryn-
jolfsson and Yang (1996), and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) provide more
comprehensive literature reviews.
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B. Unmeasured Output
In addition to unmeasured inputs, computers have also
been associated with unmeasured outputs. A variety of case
evidence, as well as a direct survey of managers (Brynjolf-
sson & Hitt, 1996a), suggests that the provision of intangi-
ble outputs such as quality, convenience, variety, or timeli-
ness represent major reasons for investing in computers.
These types of benefits are difficult to include in price
indices (Boskin et al., 1997), leading to potential understate-
ment of output and productivity growth at the aggregate
level. In particular, any purely financial accounting of the
return on computing investment will likely understate the
true output of firms that invest heavily in computerization to
improve intangible aspects of output.
Without detailed corrections of output price indices to
allow for changes in the intangible component of perfor-
mance levels, it is difficult to capture these effects directly.
But we can indirectly measure the value of intangible
performance improvements by examining the measurable
variations in output among competing firms. In particular,
firms that invest more heavily in computers than do their
competitors should achieve greater levels of intangible ben-
efits. In turn, customers will recognize and value these
benefits. Thus, we can hypothesize that firms that invest in
computers for competitive advantage will be able to charge
a higher price, force competitors to lower their prices, or
both. In aggregate industry or economy-wide data, this type
of firm-level variation will be averaged out, making it
difficult or even impossible to measure. However, at the
firm level, this variation will result in variation in measured
revenue and output, enabling at least some of this intangible
value to be detected econometrically (see a formal treatment
of this issue in appendix B). However, even firm-level data
may miss important industry-wide improvements of intan-
gibles and underestimate the contribution of computeriza-
tion to performance. If two or more competitors simulta-
neously introduce computer-supported intangible benefits,
some or all of these benefits will be passed on to their
customers and elude detection in revenue or output data.
III. Models and Data
A. Estimation Framework
We apply the standard growth accounting framework that
has been used extensively for studying the productivity of
inputs such as capital, labor, energy, and research and
development (R&D) (Berndt, 1991). We assume that the
production process of the firms in our sample can be
represented by a production function (F) that relates firm
value added (Q) to three inputs: ordinary capital stock (K),
computer capital stock (C), and labor (L). In addition, we
assume that the production function is affected by time (t)
and by the industry ( j) in which a firm (i) operates. Thus,
Qit  FKit, Lit, Cit, i, j, t. (1)
Following common practice, we assume that this relation-
ship can be approximated by a Cobb-Douglas production
function.3 For most of our analyses, we implement this
function with three inputs—ordinary capital, computer cap-
ital, and labor—written in levels or logarithms of levels
(lowercase letters for factor inputs denote logarithms; firm
and time subscripts on inputs and output are omitted except
when needed for clarity):
Q  Ai, j, tKkLlCc, (2a)
or
q  ai, j, t  kk  ll  cc. (2b)
We will also sometimes consider a four-input specification
that uses gross output as the dependent variable and in-
cludes materials as an additional input.4
The term a, often referred to as the multifactor produc-
tivity level or, more ambitiously, total factor productivity
level, captures differences in output across firms and over
time that are not accounted for by changes in the input use.
It contrasts with labor productivity by also taking account of
changes in capital inputs. Because we hypothesize the
potential existence of additional unmeasured inputs, such as
organizational capital, we will generally use the more pre-
cise terms “two-factor productivity” (2FP) and “three-factor
productivity” (3FP) in this paper, depending on whether
computers, as well as capital and labor, are explicitly in-
cluded as inputs. This allows us to highlight the inclusion of
these inputs, but not necessarily the totality of all inputs, in
our main estimating equations.5
This type of productivity framework is usually imple-
mented in time series or panel data settings by taking the
time differences of variables in logarithms to yield growth
rates. This is usually a single-time-period difference, but
longer multiperiod differences (n years) can also be used. If
input variables are measured without error, and factor ad-
justment to price and other exogenous changes is instanta-
neous, then the short- and long-difference estimates should
be identical. However, as noted by Bartelsman, Caballero,
and Lyons (1994), when adjustment is not instantaneous,
3 The Cobb-Douglas functional form has the advantage that it is the
simplest form that enables calculation of the relevant quantities of interest
without introducing so many terms that the estimates are imprecise. More
general functional forms such as the transcendental logarithmic (translog)
have been utilized in research on the levels of computer investment and
productivity (see Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1995) with output elasticity esti-
mates nearly identical to those for the Cobb-Douglas specification.
4 Previous work has suggested that the separability assumptions under-
lying the value-added formulation are often violated in practice, arguing
for a four-input output-based specification (Basu & Fernald, 1995).
However, the value-added (three-input) formulation has the advantage for
econometric estimation that it reduces biases due to the potential endo-
geneity of materials, the factor input most likely to undergo rapid adjust-
ment to output shocks.
5 Just as one way to increase labor productivity is through deepening of
physical capital, one way to increase three-factor productivity is through
deepening of organizational capital.
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longer differences can be interpreted as long-run effects of
factor input changes. Such changes include not only the
direct effect of factor inputs, but also the effects of adjust-
ment of complementary factors. The time-consuming nature
of many of the organizational changes that are complemen-
tary to computers will make long-run productivity estimates
an important part of our analysis.
In addition, when the factor inputs are measured with
error, estimates based on longer differences will typically be
less biased than estimates based on shorter differences
(Griliches & Hausman, 1986). Thus, as we compare elas-
ticity estimates at varying difference lengths, we will need
to consider this errors-in-variables argument, as well as the
long-run elasticity interpretation.
For growth accounting exercises (such as Oliner &
Sichel, 2000, or Jorgenson & Stiroh, 2000), the values of the
elasticity parameters (c, k, l) are typically assumed to
be equal to their theoretical values, thus enabling three-
factor productivity growth and the contribution of each
input to be computed without econometric estimation. Un-
der standard assumptions (cost minimization, competitive
output and input markets, and factor quantities in long-run
equilibrium), the output elasticity is equal to the ratio of the
current dollar cost of the input to the current dollar value of
output. In addition, in growth accounting practice it is
common to average these quantities over the growth inter-
val. We denote the price of output and labor by p and w
respectively. The rental price of capital (the current dollar
value of service flows for a unit of constant dollar stock) is
denoted by rk, and the rental price of computers by rc; they
are typically computed by the approach of Christensen and
Jorgenson (1969).6 This yields the following estimate of
three-factor productivity growth:
a˙n  at  atn
 qt  qtn 
1
2  rt
kKt
ptQt 
rtn
k Ktn
ptnQtn kt  ktn

1
2 wtLtptQt  wtnLtnptnQtn lt  ltn

1
2  rt
cCt
ptQt 
rtn
c Ctn
ptnQtn ct  ctn (3)
To econometrically estimate the contribution of comput-
erization, we can proceed in a number of ways. First, we can
simply compute three-factor productivity using equation (3)
and regress this value on the change in computer stock:
a˙n  ˆ  ˆ ct  ctn . (4)
The estimated parameter in this equation (ˆ ) is the contri-
bution of computerization to three-factor productivity
growth—the excess in the computer output elasticity above
its theoretical value. The total output contribution could
then be calculated by adding this excess amount to the
theoretical value derived from the input quantities and the
Jorgensonian rental price.
Alternatively, we can utilize a variant of this framework
to estimate the output elasticity directly. Here we regress
two-factor productivity growth (computed without the com-
puter term a˙nc) on computer growth. Defining
a˙n
c  qt  qtn 
1
2  rt
kKt
ptQt 
rtn
k Ktn
ptnQtn kt  ktn

1
2 wtLtptQt  wtnLtnptnQtn lt  ltn, (5)
we have the estimating equation:
a˙n
c  ˆ  ˆ cct  ctn . (6)
This approach was previously used by Adams and Jaffe
(1996) for the study of R&D productivity, and it has the
advantage that it enables a direct estimate of the output
elasticity and thus the contribution of computerization to
output growth. A potential disadvantage of the approaches
embodied in equations (3)–(6) is that they rely on proper
measurement of input quantities (capital, labor, and materi-
als) in deriving the estimate of 2FP and 3FP.
To the extent that computers may be associated with
unmeasured complements or intangible assets that might
legitimately be part of the productive assets of the firm (for
example, organizational capital), the estimates of 3FP and
2FP are likely to be higher than they otherwise would be. In
particular, such unmeasured complements can make esti-
mated growth and productivity contributions of computers
appear to be larger than the values that theory would predict
based on the factor share of computers alone.
In addition to these formulations, we can also consider
differentapproaches to thedirectestimationof theproduction-
function relationship [equation (2b)] in differences. The
most obvious formulation is to simply estimate the elastic-
ities directly, using either first differences (n  1) or long
differences (n  1) of all inputs and outputs. However, this
formulation tends to have poor empirical performance on
firm-level data, yielding implausibly low estimates for cap-
ital inputs and excess elasticities for labor and materials.7
This is because labor quantity tends to react faster to
exogenous shocks and prices than do other quasi-fixed
factors such as capital (including ordinary capital, R&D,
and computers), and therefore the smaller changes in these
other nonlabor factors are more easily overwhelmed by
6 The cost of capital is typically computed using the Jorgensonian
formula rk  cpk(r 	 
 	 pk/pk), where c is a constant that is a
function of taxes and other common factors, r is the required rate of return
on capital, 
 is the depreciation rate, and pk/pk is the proportional change
in the price of capital. This formula underlies the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) capital rental price estimates that we use for our empirical
estimates.
7 In our data, these approaches yielded an upward bias in labor and
materials elasticities of as much as 20% and downward biases in capital
elasticities of as much as 50%, as compared to their factor shares.
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measurement error. Because computers have a much smaller
factor share than capital or labor, it is important that we
minimize the estimation bias introduced by these factors. In
the context of R&D measurement, Griliches and Mairesse
(1984) therefore proposed a semi-reduced-form formulation
to directly address the endogeneity of labor. Using this
formulation in our setting yields the following system:
qt  qtn  ˆq 
ˆ k
1 l kt  ktn

ˆ c
1 l ct  ctn q,
(7)
lt  ltn  ˆl 
ˆ k
1 l kt  ktn

ˆ c
1 l ct  ctn l.
The first equation is simply a direct estimate of the produc-
tion function in differences of logarithms, omitting the labor
input term; the second is a parallel equation for labor. The
coefficient estimates (which can be constrained to be equal
across equations) are the elasticities of capital and comput-
ers relative to the labor elasticity. The actual capital and
labor elasticities can be recovered using an estimate of the
labor elasticity derived from its factor share.
B. Data Sources and Construction
The data set for this study was created by combining two
main data sources: a database of capital stock of computers
provided by Computer Intelligence InfoCorp (CII), and
public financial information obtained from Compustat II
(Compustat). We also employed rental prices for the capital
factors from the BLS, and other price deflators from various
government and private sources. In some corroborating
analyses, we also used a data set of computer hardware and
related expenses obtained through surveys conducted by
International Data Group (IDG). Appendix A provides ad-
ditional details on the data sources and construction.
Computer Stock Data: CII conducts a series of surveys
that tracks specific pieces of computer equipment in use at
approximately 25,000 sites at different locations of the 1000
largest firms in the United States. CII interviews informa-
tion systems managers to obtain detailed information on
each site’s IT hardware assets. The site sampling frequency
ranges from monthly to annually, depending on the size of
the site. CII’s interview process includes checking on hard-
ware that was reported in previous interviews to make more
accurate time series comparisons. Each piece of hardware is
market-valued and aggregated to form a measure of the total
hardware value in use at the firm. These data obviate the
need to make assumptions about retirement rates or depre-
ciation, which are typically required when constructing
capital series.8 The CII data provide a relatively narrow
definition of computers that omits software, information
system staff, and telecommunications equipment. In addi-
tion, the CII data represents the wealth stock (market value
of the assets) rather than the productive stock (the value of
assets based on output capability) of the surveyed firms.
Thus, we multiply these wealth stock asset values by the
annual aggregate ratio of the productive stock to the wealth
stock of computer assets reported by the BLS. This ratio is
approximately 1.2 and holds fairly constant across our
sample period. Annual computer stock data are available for
the Fortune 1000 for the period 1987 to 1994.
We consulted Standard & Poor’s Compustat II database
to obtain information on sales, labor expense, capital stock,
industry classification, employment, and other expenses for
all the firms in the CII database. These data were supple-
mented with price deflators from a variety of sources to
construct measures of the sample firms’ inputs and outputs
using procedures consistent with earlier work (Hall, 1990;
Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1995; Bresnahan et al., 2002). Output,
value added, and materials were deflated using the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) output deflators at the
two-digit industry level in each year.9 Labor cost was either
taken directly from Compustat where reported, or estimated
by multiplying employment by a sector-level estimate of
average labor expense. Results are similar in magnitude (but
often less precise due to the sample size reduction) when we
alternatively use employment or restrict the sample to those
firms with reported labor expense. Our rental prices for
computers and ordinary capital were based on BLS calcu-
lations. The computer rental price represents an aggregate
for the entire economy for each year, whereas the rental
price for ordinary capital is calculated for each industry (at
the NIPA two-digit level) in each year. All factor inputs are
measured in constant 1990 dollars. The average rental price
is 10.3% for ordinary capital and 44% for computers. The
large rental price for computer capital reflects the need to
compensate for very large negative capital gains due to the
deflation of real computer prices each year.
Sample: Using data from the CII database and Com-
pustat, we constructed a nearly balanced panel of 527 firms
8 This method may introduce some error in the measurement of com-
puter inputs because different types of computers are aggregated by stock
rather than flow values (weighted by rental price). The direction of such
a bias is unclear because it depends on assumptions about depreciation
rates of various types of computers at each site.
9 To the extent that firms that use computers heavily also consume
higher-quality materials, this could introduce a downward bias in the
materials estimate, because the output deflator may understate quality
change in materials. However, this may be offset partially by a bias in the
output deflator in the same direction. The effect of this bias is unknown
and cannot be directly estimated, but the fact that output-based and
value-added-based specifications (reported later) yield similar results
suggests that this bias may not be large in practice.
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in the Fortune 1000 over an 8-year period, omitting firms
from our raw data which had incomplete data, especially
those which had less than 6 of the 8 years present in the
sample, and those which had missing data other than at the
beginning or end of the measurement period. This left us
with a sample of 4097 firm-year observations. We also have
corroborating estimates of firm’s computer stocks for 1,324
of these observations that were gathered by IDG. IDG
gathered data from a single officer in each firm and used a
somewhat different definition of computer capital than was
used by CII. For the overlapping firms, the computer capital
data had a correlation of 73% between CII and IDG data
sets.
The firms in the sample are quite large, averaging $1
billion in value added. Within the sample, 57% of the firms
are from the manufacturing industry, 41% from service, and
2% from mining, construction, and agriculture. Some ser-
vice industries—banking, insurance—are largely excluded
because many of the firms in these industries do not report
ordinary capital stock on Compustat. Because these indus-
tries are particularly computer-intensive, the firms in our
sample are somewhat less computer-intensive than the
economy as a whole. Otherwise, our sample appears to be
broadly representative of large firms in the U.S. economy,
and firms in the sample account for about 15% of total U.S.
economic output over our sample period.
IV. Results
A. Productivity Analyses
In table 1, we report the results of estimating the 3FP
contribution of computerization, based on a regression of
3FP growth on computer growth [equation (4)]. We report
the results for difference lengths varying from one year to
seven years, the maximal difference possible in our data.
Because differences include overlapping data, this intro-
duces a possible correlation between the disturbances for
differences with different base years. We therefore perform
our estimates weighting the data based on the theoretical
form of the within-firm correlation matrix (unique to each
difference length), and then use a robust variance estimator
to ensure the standard errors are not biased by empirical
deviations from this theoretical structure.10
Column (1) of table 1 shows that in the base specification,
with no time or industry controls, computers are signifi-
cantly correlated with productivity growth when measured
at all difference levels (t-statistics for all estimates are
above 2.2). A striking finding is that the estimated coeffi-
cients increase monotonically and substantially as we move
from a 1-year difference specification to a 7-year difference
specification. The 7-year difference estimate is significantly
larger than each of the 1- through 4-year difference esti-
mates at p  0.05 or better, and the 6-year difference is
significantly above the 1-year and 2-year difference esti-
mates ( p  0.05).11
10 The exact form of the within-firm covariance matrix (where each row
and column corresponds to a particular year of observation for a single
firm) under zero autocorrelation for an observation with a difference
length n ending in year t compared to an observation ending in year t 
j is given by cov(t  tn, tj  tjn). This yields a matrix with
diagonal elements 22, a jth off-diagonal element of 2, and zero
otherwise, where 2 is the variance of the disturbance term. Estimates are
computed using the STATA xtgee command with this theoretical covari-
ance structure as the weighting input and standard errors computed by the
“robust” option, which performs the calculation based on the empirical
covariance matrix of disturbances and is thus robust to other forms of
correlation or heteroskedasticity.
11 We also separately investigated the year-by-year coefficients for each
regression (results not shown). Although they vary somewhat from year to
year, we generally cannot reject the restriction that the elasticities are the
same over time for the same difference length (except for one observation
in 1-year differences), and we find the general pattern of rising coefficients
nearly identical to that shown in table 1.
TABLE 1.—REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF MULTIFACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH ON COMPUTER GROWTH USING VARYING DIFFERENCE LENGTHS AND
DIFFERENT CONTROL VARIABLES
Difference Length
(years)
No Controls
(1)
Year
(2)
Industry
(3)
Year & Industry
(4)
Sample
Size
1 0.0198 0.0141 0.0166 0.0107 3570
(0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0082) (0.0089)
2 0.0206 0.0144 0.0179 0.0116 3043
(0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0082) (0.0089)
3 0.0236 0.0177 0.0199 0.0139 2516
(0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0095) (0.0099)
4 0.0236 0.0158 0.0237 0.0162 1989
(0.0093) (0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0097)
5 0.0387 0.0398 0.0347 0.0360 1462
(0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0106) (0.0111)
6 0.0430 0.0434 0.0355 0.0359 935
(0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0137)
7 0.0535 0.0535 0.0388 0.0388 451
(0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0176) (0.0176)
Estimates of the computer coefficient from equation (4) are shown for a range of difference lengths (rows) using different controls (columns); each cell represents a separate regression. Industry controls are used
that divide the economy into 10 industries—see footnote 12. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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We also examine different sets of control variables, one
set for year and another for major industry.12 These control
variables remove effects of industry heterogeneity and pos-
sibly short-run time productivity shocks common across all
firms that might bias the coefficients. At the same time, they
also remove the portion of 3FP that is shared by all firms in
an industry or across the economy. Thus, the results with
these controls are likely to underestimate the true 3FP
contribution of computers and their associated comple-
ments. In principle, comparing the results with and without
controls can provide an indication of how much, if any, of
the 3FP growth attributable to computers is common to the
economy or industry.
We find that industry and time effects do influence the
measured productivity contribution of computerization. Ex-
amining the 1-year difference specification (moving across
the first row of table 1), we see that time controls reduce the
computer excess elasticity (3FP) estimate by 30% and the
industry controls by 20%, and combined they reduce it as
much as 45%. In the regressions with the controls, we
typically cannot reject the null hypothesis of no contribution
of computers to 3FP growth in 1-year through 3-year dif-
ferences, but we consistently find that the estimated elastic-
ity of computers significantly exceeds the computer input
share in longer differences. All results continue to show
monotonically increasing coefficients as difference length
increases.
We also consider a four-input productivity formulation in
which we use gross output as the dependent variable of the
production function and include materials as a separate
input. The results are shown in table 2 for the no-controls
regression [column (1)] and the regression with full industry
and time controls [column (2)]. Other regressions show
comparable behavior to those in Table 1 and are omitted. As
expected, given the smaller factor shares of capital and labor
in this specification, the precision of the estimates is sub-
stantially diminished. However, the magnitudes are compa-
rable to the earlier estimates.13 With or without controls,
short differences are typically not significantly different
from 0, but many of the longer-difference results are.
Because the value-added specification yields more precise
estimates and exhibits no apparent bias relative to the gross
output specification, we focus the discussion on value-
added specifications in the remainder of the paper.14
In the remainder of table 2, we examine estimates of 3FP
calculations that omit the computer input term [equation
(6)]—the coefficient estimates are thus output elasticities.
Applying the Jorgensonian rental formula to the data, the
average input share of computers in our sample is 0.84% of
value added. Thus, if these results are consistent with
table 1, they should be higher in point estimates by
0.0084 (or 0.0034 for the output specifications). As we see
from the table, this relationship is approximately true. Al-
though there had been questions about whether computers
12 Our major industry controls divide the economy into 10 sectors:
high-tech manufacturing, process manufacturing, other nondurable man-
ufacturing, other durable manufacturing, mining/construction, trade, trans-
portation, utilities, finance, and other services.
13 The ratio of value added to output is 40%, so we expect these
coefficients to be 40% of the results reported in table 1.
14 We continue to compute comparable output-based results as a robust-
ness check.
TABLE 2.—REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF MULTIFACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH ON COMPUTER GROWTH USING VARYING DIFFERENCE LENGTHS
AND ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
Specification: 3FP 2FP without IP
Output metric: Output Value Added Output
Difference Length
(years)
No Controls
(1)
Year & Industry
(2)
No Controls
(3)
Year & Industry
(4)
No Controls
(5)
Year & Industry
(6)
1 0.0039 0.0018 0.0289 0.0198 0.0076 0.0055
(0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0038) (0.0040)
2 0.0048 0.0026 0.0300 0.0210 0.0085 0.0063
(0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0037) (0.0039)
3 0.0061 0.0039 0.0337 0.0240 0.0100 0.0076
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0041) (0.0041)
4 0.0058 0.0038 0.0339 0.0266 0.0096 0.0076
(0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0089) (0.0093) (0.0038) (0.0040)
5 0.0107 0.0108 0.0494 0.0466 0.0147 0.0148
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0049) (0.0050)
6 0.0144 0.0118 0.0559 0.0486 0.0193 0.0165
(0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0064) (0.0063)
7 0.0182 0.0143 0.0668 0.0518 0.0234 0.0193
(0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0179) (0.0169) (0.0081) (0.0081)
Regression estimates of the computer coefficient using a range of difference lengths (rows) for different specifications (columns); each cell represents a separate regression. Columns (1) and (2) represent the
regression of computer growth on 3FP growth [analogous to equation (4)] using gross output rather than value added as the output metric and including a materials input term. Columns (3) and (4) represent a
regression of computers on 2FP growth where 2FP growth is computed using value added but without including a computer input term [equation (6)]—estimated coefficients are the output elasticities of computers.
Columns (5) and (6) represent the equivalent regressions to columns (1) and (2), calculating 2FP. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes are as shown in table 1.
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were contributing significantly to output when dates from
before our time period were studied (for example, Solow,
1987; Morrison & Berndt, 1990; Loveman, 1994), we can
reject the hypothesis that computers do not contribute to
output growth in almost all of our specifications. As before,
coefficients rise monotonically as difference length is in-
creased in all specifications.
In table 3, we probe the robustness of the results to
potential specification errors in capital and labor. System
estimates of the semireduced form specification (using iter-
ated seemingly unrelated regression) of the computer and
ordinary capital elasticities are reported in column pairs
(1)–(2) without controls and (3)–(4) with controls. Because
we cannot reject the equality of coefficients across the labor
and output equations in the system, we impose this linear
restriction for increased efficiency. The results that appear in
the table are the elasticities and their standard errors (rather
than the ratios of the elasticities to the labor elasticities),
calculated using an average labor input share of 0.575.
Consistent with the findings of Griliches and Mairesse
(1984) in the R&D context, the semi-reduced-form specifi-
cations show considerably greater precision in the estimates,
with t-statistics on the order of 10 (compared to 2–3 for the
3FP regressions). However, the results do appear to be
slightly different. First, the rise in coefficients is much
steeper as we move from 1-year to 7-year differences: there
is as much as a fivefold increase in the share of output
attributable to computerization. By contrast, on the 3FP
regressions, the corresponding rise was no more than a
factor of 3. In addition, the coefficients on the 1-year
differences imply that there is an output growth contribution
but not a net productivity growth contribution in the short
run. Another useful observation from this table is that the
rise as we move to longer differences is much more sub-
stantial for computer elasticity (	309%) than for the ordi-
nary capital coefficient (	70%), using estimates from the
regression with time and industry controls. In addition, the
ordinary capital elasticity is relatively unaffected by the
presence of time and industry controls, suggesting that there
is substantially more cross-industry heterogeneity in the
contribution of computers, and that computers may be more
strongly correlated with economy-wide changes in output (a
correlation attenuated by the use of time controls).
B. Instrumental Variables Estimates
Our earlier results assume that computer investment is
determined by exogenous factors and is not correlated with
shocks in productivity or output. The time controls remove
the effects of shocks common to all firms over time or
across industries.15 However, this approach may be inade-
quate if the shocks are firm-specific. For example, if firms
disproportionately increase investments in computers in
years where demand for their products is unexpectedly high,
our short-difference elasticity results may be upward biased.
Alternatively, if firms change their other expenses in re-
sponse to demand shocks more than their investments in
computers, then our previous panel-data estimators may
underestimate the contributions of computerization.
For instruments, we require variables that are correlated
with computer investment at the firm level, but not with
output shocks. One reason why different firms might have
varying levels of computer investments is that, due to
historical choices, they have different technological infra-
structures, which make incremental investments in comput-
ers and their complements more or less difficult. For exam-
ple, companies with an existing client-server computing
architecture may find it faster and less costly to implement
modern software systems, such as enterprise resource plan-
ning,16 which typically run in a client-server environment.
Alternatively, firms with aging production equipment may
find it more difficult to adapt to electronic controls and other
computer-enabled production methods. An aging capital
base may also represent a firm-specific inability or unwill-
ingness to invest in new technologies. Finally, we might
expect, especially in the short run, that capital constraints
15 Results are also similar when we include controls for the interaction of
time and industry (not shown).
16 Enterprise resource planning systems are integrated software suites
that integrate different functional areas of a firm such as production
planning, human resource management, and inventory management.
TABLE 3.—REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THREE-FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
ON COMPUTER GROWTH USING A SEMI-REDUCED-FORM SPECIFICATION,
VARYING DIFFERENCE LENGTHS, AND CONTROLS
Difference
Length
(years)
No Controls Year and Industry
Computer
Coefficient
(1)
Capital
Coefficient
(2)
Computer
Coefficient
(3)
Capital
Coefficient
(4)
1 0.0109 0.1694 0.0085 0.1694
(0.0020) (0.0053) (0.0021) (0.0052)
2 0.0236 0.1914 0.0197 0.1915
(0.0025) (0.0056) (0.0026) (0.0056)
3 0.0334 0.2069 0.0290 0.2060
(0.0031) (0.0060) (0.0030) (0.0059)
4 0.0346 0.2223 0.0326 0.2182
(0.0035) (0.0065) (0.0035) (0.0064)
5 0.0395 0.2329 0.0401 0.2277
(0.0043) (0.0073) (0.0042) (0.0072)
6 0.0429 0.2441 0.0399 0.2410
(0.0058) (0.0092) (0.0055) (0.0089)
7 0.0538 0.2489 0.0456 0.2486
(0.0087) (0.0129) (0.0083) (0.0126)
Regression estimates of the computer coefficient using a range of difference lengths (rows) for
different specifications (columns). Each row in paired columns (1)–(2) and (3)–(4) represents estimates
on the computers and ordinary capital coefficients in a single systems regression. Columns (1) and (2)
represent coefficient estimates for computers and ordinary capital in a semi-reduced-form specification
[equation (7)] using iterated seemingly unrelated regression (ISUR) constraining the capital and IT
coefficients the same across the two-equation system. Columns (3) and (4) represent a second semi-
reduced-form system estimate with year and industry controls. Coefficients in columns (1)–(4) are
converted to elasticities by multiplying by the sample-average labor input share. ISUR standard errors are
shown. Sample sizes are as shown in table 1.
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could be a deterrent to computer investments or investments
in computer-related complements.17
We therefore hypothesize a principally cross-sectional set
of instrumental variables (IV) for computer growth that
includes five measures in total. The first and second mea-
sures assess the extent of a firms’ deployment of a client-
server computing architecture (the ratio of personal com-
puters to mainframe terminals and the fraction of PCs
connected to a network). The third measure is capital age,
which reflects other production technologies. The final two
measures concern capital costs and investment constraints
(the debt-to-equity ratio, which is a measure of leverage,
and beta, which is a measure of the volatility of the firms’
stock price that is a key driver of the cost of capital under
the capital asset pricing model). These instruments are
introduced in levels, and their effects are allowed to vary by
sector and time. We also include time dummies and industry
control variables in the regressions to remove changes in
common exogenous factors over time (such as prices) as
well as industry heterogeneity. The time dummies also
accommodate any possible set of time-series instruments
common across all firms.
Instrumental variables estimates were computed by a
two-stage procedure to enable us to compute standard errors
comparable to those reported in our other productivity
estimates. In the first stage, 3FP and computer growth were
projected on the instrument set using ordinary least squares.
Then, the fitted values from this first-stage regression were
used to compute productivity contribution estimates using
the same technique to account for within-firm autocorrela-
tion as before (see footnote 10).
Results of this IV approach for various specifications are
shown in table 4. The specifications based on the 3FP
regression (column 1) show coefficient estimates substan-
tially larger than any of the previous estimates. Both regres-
sions also show the now-familiar rise in coefficients as a
function of the difference period, although the rise is not as
large (60%–80%) and is no longer monotonic. As one might
expect, the estimates of the semireduced form using IV are
more comparable to those without IV, both in the magnitude
(0.019) of the one-year differences and in the substantial
additional rise as the time difference is lengthened. Similar
results are found on the output-based specifications [column
(4)]. The IV results provide evidence against the alternative
hypothesis that endogeneity leads to an upward bias in
the estimate of computer productivity (if anything, they
suggest the opposite). Similarly, they suggest that the rising
17 We considered using price data, but decided against it because prices
do not vary across firms. We also considered techniques such as those
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) or Griliches and Hausman (1986),
which enable instrumental variables estimation in panel data without
external instruments. In general, factor growth rates for a particular firm
have little correlation over time (Blundell and Bond, 1999), making it
difficult to estimate production functions in differences with internal
instruments. In our data, Arellano and Bond’s (1991) dynamic panel data
estimator did not perform well—point estimates in a first-difference
specification were similar to our results (computer coefficients around
0.013), but had very wide confidence intervals, reflecting low first-stage
power. The “systems GMM” estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998)
performed slightly better and yielded a computer elasticity point estimate
of 0.014, but the estimates were still quite imprecise. However, these
estimators are not suitable for long-difference estimation, because long
differences alter the moment restrictions that can be used in identification.
TABLE 4.—INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATES OF THREE-FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND OUTPUT GROWTH ON COMPUTER GROWTH USING VARYING
DIFFERENCE LENGTHS AND DIFFERENT SPECIFICATIONS
Specification: Value Added Semi-Reduced-Form Output
Controls: Computer Coeff., Capital Coeff.,
Difference in
Length (years)
Year & Industry Year & Industry Year & Industry Year & Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 0.0599 0.0190 0.1193 0.0096
(0.0125) (0.0016) (0.0056) (0.0026)
2 0.0493 0.0469 0.1316 0.0077
(0.0119) (0.0025) (0.0055) (0.0026)
3 0.0668 0.0846 0.1557 0.0112
(0.0117) (0.0036) (0.0059) (0.0028)
4 0.0599 0.0632 0.1788 0.0079
(0.0132) (0.0039) (0.0067) (0.0033)
5 0.0967 0.0638 0.1852 0.0138
(0.0177) (0.0050) (0.0078) (0.0038)
6 0.1151 0.0583 0.2032 0.0181
(0.0220) (0.0078) (0.0107) (0.0048)
7 0.1010 0.0782 0.2024 0.0150
(0.0246) (0.0105) (0.0140) (0.0057)
Instrumental variables (IV) regression estimates of the computer coefficient using a range of difference lengths (rows) for different specifications (columns). Each cell in columns (1) and (4) represent a separate
regression; the pair of columns (2)–(3) for each row represents a separate systems regression. Column (1) represents an IV estimate of equation (4). Columns (2) and (3) represent an ISUR systems regression,
constraining the computer and ordinary capital coefficients to be the same across equations and normalized by the sample-average labor share [see equation (7)]. Column (4) represents an equivalent regression to
column (1) using 3FP calculated with gross output instead of value added and including a materials term. All regressions use the same instrument set (in levels): capital age, ratio of PCs to mainframe terminals,
ratio of network nodes to PCs, debt-equity ratio, and stock market beta. All instruments are interacted with time and industry dummy variables. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses except in columns
(2) and (3), where ISUR standard errors are reported.
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coefficients are not easily explained by an errors-in-
variables bias, which would be removed by instrumental
variables estimation. Instead, the results are consistent with
the accumulation of complementary inputs that enhance the
output contributions of computerization over time.
C. Production-Function Estimation and an Alternative
Data Set
To examine the possibility that our results are unique to
this data set or the modeling approach we employ, we now
analyze the data using production functions instead of
directly examining productivity, and we compare results
from our data with those of an alternative data set from
International Data Group (IDG). In addition, we can further
examine the effects of measurement error on our estimates
by using the IDG estimate of computer capital stock as an
instrument. Under the assumption that measurement errors
are uncorrelated between the IDG and the CII data sets,
using the IDG estimate as an instrument for the CII com-
puter stock should remove bias due to measurement error
(although it will do little to reduce the effects of other forms
of endogeneity).
Most previous firm-level studies have focused on esti-
mating production functions in which the elasticity of other
factors (capital and labor) are estimated from the data but
are constrained to be the same across firms. The results from
a three-input (computers, capital, labor) production-function
estimation are shown in tables 5 and 6, using both our data
set and the data set from IDG, which was used in earlier
research by Brynjolfsson and Hitt and by Lichtenberg.
Overall, we find consistency both within this study and
between this study and previous work. Ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates of the production function in levels
with time and industry controls are reported for each data
set. These estimates were obtained by pooling the data and
estimating the coefficients with OLS, with the standard
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and within-firm cor-
relation using the Huber-White method. The CII estimates
for the computer elasticity are higher than the corresponding
IDG estimate, but they are not significantly different. The
difference may be due to better precision in the CII com-
puter stock estimates than in the IDG estimates,18 which
leads to less bias from errors in variables. Estimated coef-
ficients on other factors are comparable. When we run an IV
regression, instrumenting the CII computer capital level by
the corresponding IDG estimate, we find that the coefficient
on computers rises by about 20%. These IV estimates are
also remarkably close to the 7-year difference results. This
is not surprising, because one can view a levels regression
as equivalent to a difference regression where the difference
length becomes very large. Altogether, this suggests consis-
tency in our estimate of the long-run measured contribution
of computerization.
To further explore the effect of measurement error, we
can utilize the IDG estimate (this time in differences) as an
instrument for the IV 3FP regressions, such as those re-
ported in table 4. Results of this analysis [comparable to
column (1) of table 4 with this additional instrument] are
shown in table 6. Due to the substantial reduction in the size
of the data set (because IDG is both a smaller and a less
complete panel), the confidence intervals on the estimates
are quite wide. However, we still see rising coefficients as
the difference length increases, at least up until 5-year
differences, where only 66 observations remain. This appears
to provide further evidence against the alternative hypothesis
that our observed pattern of rising coefficients over longer
differences is attributable simply to a measurement-error
explanation.
18 Recall that CII uses a more thorough asset-tracking method than
IDG’s interviewing of a single key employee at the surveyed firm.
TABLE 5.—REGRESSION OF VALUE ADDED ON FACTOR INPUT QUANTITY—
LEVELS REGRESSION
Specification CII-OLS IDG-OLS CII-IV
Column (1) (2) (3)
Computer capital
elasticity 0.0483 0.0272 0.0584
(0.0110) (0.0086) (0.0272)
Ordinary capital elasticity 0.1963 0.1764 0.1678
(0.0178) (0.0154) (0.0181)
Labor elasticity 0.7189 0.7791 0.7556
(0.0281) (0.0216) (0.0283)
Control variables Year, industry Year, industry Year, industry
R2 (%) 95.0 95.8 95.8
Sample size:
Observations 4097 1324 1324
Firms 527 357 357
Levels regression of value added on computers, capital, and labor quantity for the Computer
Intelligence InfoCorp (CII) and International Data Group (IDG) data sets. Huber-White robust clustered
(by firm) standard errors reported in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) represent OLS regressions.
Column (3) represents the equivalent regression of column (1) instrumenting computer capital with the
corresponding estimate from IDG.
TABLE 6.—INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES REGRESSION OF THREE-FACTOR
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH ON COMPUTER GROWTH USING IDG COMPUTER
CAPITAL QUANTITY AS AN INSTRUMENT AND VARYING DIFFERENCE LENGTHS
Difference Length
(years) Estimate
Sample
Size
1 0.0093 779
(0.0192)
2 0.0473 551
(0.0277)
3 0.0724 331
(0.0333)
4 0.0938 183
(0.0228)
5 0.0357 66
(0.0244)
IV regression of 3FP growth on computer growth using a range of difference lengths (rows). Identical
to regression in table 4, column (1) (specification: value added; control: year and industry), except the
difference in IDG computer stock is included in the instrument list. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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V. Discussion and Analysis
A. Potential Explanations for the Results
The principal results from this econometric analysis are:
(1) the measured output contributions of computerization in
the short run are approximately equal to computer capital
costs, (2) the measured long-run contributions of comput-
erization are significantly above computer capital costs (a
factor of 5 or more in point estimates), and (3) the estimated
contributions steadily increase as we move from short to
long differences. These results are robust to a wide range of
alternative treatments, including: using productivity growth
or output specifications; estimating production functions
rather than productivity values; and applying a series of
econometric adjustments for the endogeneity of labor and
(subject to limitations of our instrument set) the endogeneity
or measurement error of computer investment.
One interpretation of these results could be that comput-
ers, at least during this period, had excess rates of return
(elasticity per unit of capital input). However, in light of the
related research on how computers actually affect busi-
nesses organization and processes, a more consistent expla-
nation is that computer investment is complemented by
time-consuming organizational changes. We hypothesize
that the short-time-difference estimates represent the direct
contribution of computer investment—the increase in out-
put associated with the purchase and installation of a com-
puting asset for some narrow, short-term business purpose.
We hypothesize that the long-time differences represent the
overall value contributed by the combined computers 	
complements system—the increase in productivity associ-
ated with longer-term adaptation of the organization to more
fully exploit its computing assets. In this interpretation, the
high values of the long-time-difference estimates correctly
reflect the total contribution of the computers 	 comple-
ments system and not just the contribution of computers
alone.
The presence of the complements complicates any calcu-
lations of the return on the original computer investments.
In particular, we would likely overestimate the rate of return
if we used these estimates of the output contribution and
only included measured computer capital stock in the de-
nominator. Such a calculation would ignore the potentially
large, if intangible, investments in the complements that
drive the productive use of computers. Alternatively, if we
are willing to assume that firms are efficient, on average, in
their investments in both tangible (computers) and intangi-
ble (complements) assets, then we can derive the likely
magnitude of intangible investments that complement com-
puter investments.
This implies that measured “excess” returns ascribed to
computers may provide an indirect estimate of the input
quantity of these complementary factors, if one assumes that
computers and the complements actually earn only normal
returns. In this interpretation, for every dollar of computer
capital stock, there are four or more additional dollars of
unmeasured complements that are correlated with the mea-
sured computer capital. These hidden complements could
then account for the additional output we measure. More-
over, the rising coefficients over time imply that the adjust-
ment in complementary factors is not instantaneous. In the
remainder of this section, we discuss the evidence regarding
three plausible alternative explanations, as well as ways of
distinguishing the proposed explanation of organizational
complements from the alternative explanations.
Alternative Explanation 1: Random Measurement Error:
If computer inputs were measured with random error, we
would expect estimates on computers’ contribution to be
biased downward (Griliches & Hausman, 1986). This bias
should be most pronounced in shorter differences, since the
amount of “signal” (for example, the true change in com-
puter investment) is likely to be reduced by differencing
more than the “noise,” because the latter is less likely to be
correlated over time. Thus, the signal-to-noise ratio, which
is inversely proportional to the bias, is likely to increase as
longer differences are taken.19 Thus, our rising coefficients
are potentially consistent with a random-measurement-error
explanation.
However, three observations contradict this measurement-
error hypothesis. First, errors-in-variables models would
predict that the relationship between elasticity and differ-
ence length would have a specific, concave pattern. If
random error is uncorrelated over time, then the true elas-
ticity is related to the measured elasticity by (n) 
true[1  error2 /(nsignal2 	 error2 )], where error2 is the error
variance and signal2 is the true variance in the input. In our
data, no single assumption on the error variance fits the
observed pattern of our coefficients well. Second, some of
the treatments (using alternative estimates of computer
capital stocks and IV) should reduce or eliminate the effects
of measurement error and thus suppress the pattern of rising
coefficients if measurement error is the cause of that pattern.
But the same pattern of rising coefficients appears in the IV
regressions, and instrumenting the CII data with the alter-
native estimate for IDG to reduce the measurement error
also preserves the increasing-coefficients result. Third, and
perhaps most important, the errors-in-variables explanation
implies that even the long-time-difference estimates under-
state the true elasticity. Yet the observed estimates taken at
face value suggest that computer investments generate ex-
traordinary returns, so if random measurement error is
creating a downward bias, then the true and higher magni-
tude of the effect of computer investments is still unex-
plained. Therefore, even though we believe there may be
19 In addition, because changes in different inputs for the same firm are
nearly uncorrelated in our sample, the same downward bias should be
evident in our specifications that have multiple regressors, such as the
semi-reduced-form estimates. This is a straightforward calculation from
the standard results on the effects of errors in variables with multiple
regressors (see, for example, Greene, 1993).
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substantial random measurement error in our measurements
of computer inputs, this does not appear to be the sole, or
even the principal, explanation of our findings of excess
returns. In particular, random measurement error cannot
explain why the measured long-run elasticity is so large
relative to the factor share of computer capital.
Alternative Explanation 2: Miscounted Complements:
Our main conclusion is that organizational investments are
probably the largest and most important complements to
computers. However, there are a variety of other, simpler
complements to the technical investments measured in the
data for this study. Computer hardware and peripherals
(measured in our analysis) are only one input of a set of
technical complements including software, communications
and networking equipment, computer training, and support
costs.
The size of these technical complements can be consid-
erable. For instance, the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) estimates that in 1996, current dollar business in-
vestment in software was $95.1Bn while business invest-
ment in computer hardware was $70.9Bn, a ratio of 1.2 : 1
(BEA, 2000). Whether or not technical complements such
as software can influence our estimates of the computer
elasticity and productivity contribution depends on whether
and how they are included in other capital or labor (and thus
measured as other inputs in the growth accounting frame-
work).
Productivity estimation, in which omitted factors appear
as either capital or labor, has been studied in the context of
R&D (Griliches, 1988, chapter 15; Schankermann, 1981).
Of particular concern in these studies was that the labor
input devoted to R&D was double-counted, appearing as
both R&D expense and labor expense. A similar framework
can be extended to cases where omitted factors are simply
misallocated between categories but correlated with the
primary factor of interest (see Hitt, 1996, chapter 1, appen-
dix D). However, because these misclassifications have
offsetting effects—factor productivity estimates of comput-
ers are biased upward because the computer input quantity
is understated, but are biased downward because the con-
tribution of these complements is being credited to capital
or labor—this form of misclassification may not substan-
tially influence our results. For instance, if one assumed that
there was $2 each of misclassified capital and labor for each
$1 of computer stock, then it would result in only a 20%
upward bias in the elasticity estimate, based on the deriva-
tion appearing in Hitt (1996).20 Thus, although this form of
misclassification can explain some of the apparent excess
returns, it is too small to be the principal explanation. In
addition, this type of misclassification does not explain the
rising coefficients over longer differences.
Alternative Explanation 3: Uncounted Complements:
The same is not true for factors that are complementary to
computers but omitted entirely from the measures of other
factor inputs. This can arise in two situations. First, it arises
if for some reason firms are historically endowed with these
complements and they do not require current investment to
maintain them (for example, if a set of modern, computer-
friendly business processes were present at the outset of our
sample period). Second, it arises if firms are actively invest-
ing in building these complements, but the costs are ex-
pensed against labor or materials rather than capitalized. In
either situation, only a small portion of the overall invest-
ment appears in the growth accounting estimate. Over our
sample period, it was indeed uncommon for many aspects of
computing projects to be capitalized according to Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rules, including inter-
nally developed software. There were considerable changes
in these rules in the late 1990s to better recognize software
as an investment, but many other types of project costs—
especially organizational change investments—are rarely
allowed to be capitalized [see Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) or
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) for a discussion].
The effect of this type of misclassification can be large.
For instance, if there is $1.2 of unmeasured software stock
per $1 of computer stock (as stated by BLS estimates), this
could account for a 120% overstatement of the measured
rate of return to computers. Since software is likely to
represent a considerable portion of the unmeasured techni-
cal complements (that do not appear in current expense), it
would suggest that any excess returns beyond a factor of 2
are probably due to other complements. The most natural
candidates are organizational complements such as business
processes and organization.
This explanation also ties in closely with our finding of
rising coefficients over longer time differences. If, over the
short run, the current cost (appearing in labor or materials)
of either technical or organizational investments is large
relative to their accumulated stock, then the offsetting ef-
fects of misclassification on the elasticity estimate come
into play. Over longer horizons the stock is large relative to
current expense, so there is no corresponding downward
bias in the elasticity estimates and consequently we observe
high measured returns to computers.
B. Firm-Level Estimates and Aggregate Output Growth
Using our elasticity estimates for computers and the
annual real growth rate of computer capital of about 25%
per year, computers and their associated complements have
added approximately 0.25% to 0.5% annually to output
growth at the firm level over this period. As the factor share
of computers has grown, so has the output contribution of
computerization, ceteris paribus. This contribution will also
20 This analysis shows that as long as computers are small relative to
capital and labor, the measured rate of return of computers (output
contribution per dollar of factor input) will be equal to a weighted average
of the rates of return of the various inputs, with weights equal to the
amount of misclassification.
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appear as increases in productivity growth as conventionally
measured (i.e., including labor and tangible capital), al-
though without estimates of the cost of the complementary
investments we do not know whether our system of com-
puters and complements would show productivity growth in
a metric which fully accounted for the complements as
additional inputs (such as intangible organizational capital).
However, because our productivity calculation reflects only
private returns, including rent stealing but not productivity
spillovers, we also cannot know whether the aggregate
effect on the economy is smaller or larger than that of the
private returns.
If computers were more likely than other inputs to be
used to capture rents from competitors, then the aggregate
returns to the economy would be less than the sum of the
private returns we measure. Firms that invest in computers
would merely displace those that do not. Worse, the net
effect would be to lower aggregate profits because redistrib-
uting rents is a zero-sum game that has no effect on
aggregate profits, whereas computer expenditures are costly.
However, aggregate corporate profits do not appear to be
any lower in our sample period, and there is some evidence
that they grew.
There is more evidence for an effect in the opposite
direction—computer investments generate positive returns
both for the firm and, in aggregate, for the economy. Some
of the private benefits of computerization spill over to
benefit consumers and even competing firms. For example,
when firms like Wal-Mart demonstrate new IT-enabled
efficiencies in computerized supply chain management,
their competitors attempt to imitate any successful innova-
tions (with varying degrees of success). These innovations
are generally not subject to any form of intellectual property
protection and are widely and deliberately copied, often
with the aid of consulting firms, benchmarking services, and
business school professors. Another example of positive
externalities is the improved visibility IT systems provide
across the value chain, which reduces the impact of exog-
enous shocks—companies are now less prone (but not
immune) to excessive inventory buildups. Job mobility also
disseminates computer-related benefits as IT professionals
move from firm to firm or use industry knowledge to create
new entrants. As a result, the gains to the economy might
plausibly be much larger than the private gains to the
original innovator.
Computer investments also lead to increases in less
observed—but publicly shared—forms of productivity.
When two or more competing firms simultaneously invest
in flexible factory automation systems, most of the produc-
tivity benefits are passed on to consumers via competition in
the form of greater product variety, faster response, and
fewer stockouts. As noted earlier, these types of outputs are
not measured well, leading to underestimates of aggregate
productivity growth.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presents direct evidence that computerization
contributes to productivity and output growth as conven-
tionally measured in a broad cross-section of large firms.
Furthermore, the pattern of rising growth contributions over
longer time periods suggests that computers are part of a
larger system of technological and organizational change
that increases firm-level productivity over time. This is
consistent with the conception of computers as a general-
purpose technology. Computerization is not simply buying
computer capital; instead it involves a broader collection of
complementary investments and innovations, some of
which take years to implement.
Specifically, although computer investment generates
useful returns in its first years of service, we find that greater
output contributions accrue over time. When we examine
the data in 1-year differences, we find that computerization
contributes to output an amount roughly equal to the factor
share of computers. This implies that computers contribute
to output growth but not to productivity growth in the short
run. Over longer time horizons (between 3 and 7 years),
computerization is associated with an output contribution
that is substantially greater than the factor share of comput-
ers alone—between 2 and 5 times as much as the short-run
impact. This implies a substantial contribution to long-run
productivity growth as conventionally measured.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the
long-term growth contribution of computerization repre-
sents the combined contribution of computers and comple-
mentary organizational investment. Other explanations for
our findings, such as measurement error (either random or
systematic), do not explain these results as well. Our instru-
mental variables regressions also suggest that endogeneity
does not appear to lead to upward biases in the estimation of
computers’ contribution. The magnitude of the long-run
output elasticity associated with computerization is too
large to be explained solely by omitted technical comple-
ments (like software). By contrast, computer-enabled orga-
nizational investments, such as developing new business
processes and inventing new ways to interact with custom-
ers and suppliers, are plausibly of sufficient magnitude to
account for the additional output growth.
Although the late 1990s saw a surge in productivity and
output as well as a corresponding surge in computer invest-
ment, it is important to note that our analysis is based on
earlier data from the late 1980s and early 1990s. This earlier
time period did not enjoy extraordinary growth in the
overall economy. If computers indeed require several years
to realize their potential growth contribution, the economic
performance in the late 1990s, including the surge in mea-
sured productivity, in part reflects the massive computer and
organizational investments made in the early 1990s. Fur-
thermore, high private returns associated with computeriza-
tion and the increase stock of organizational capital that we
impute for the early 1990s also provide the foundation for
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the decision by firms to increase their nominal investments
in computers shortly thereafter.
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APPENDIX A
Variables and Data Construction
The variables used for this analysis were constructed as follows:
1. Sales
Total sales as reported on Compustat [item 12, Sales (Net)] deflated by
two-digit industry-level deflators from Gross Output and Related Series
by Industry from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1996) for 1987–1993,
and estimated for 1994 using the 5-year average inflation rate by industry.
2. Ordinary Capital
This figure was computed from the total book value of capital (equip-
ment, structures, and all other capital) following the method in Hall
(1990). The gross book value of capital stock [Compustat item 7, Property,
Plant and Equipment (Total  Gross)] was deflated by the capital
investment deflator (by industry) reported in “Capital and Related Mea-
sures from the Two-Digit Database” (BLS, 2001). The deflator was
applied at the calculated average age of the capital stock, based on the
ratio of total accumulated depreciation [calculated from Compustat item 8,
Property, Plant and Equipment (Total  Net)] to current depreciation
[Compustat item 14, Depreciation and Amortization]. The calculation of
average age differs slightly from the method in Hall (1993), which made
a further adjustment for current depreciation. The constant-dollar value of
computer capital was subtracted from this result. Thus, the sum of
ordinary capital and computer capital equals total capital stock.
3. Capital Rental Prices (Ordinary Capital)
This series was obtained from the BLS multifactor productivity by
industry estimates “Capital and Related Measures from the Two-Digit
Database” (BLS, 2001). This publication was also the source of the capital
deflators used in our analysis. These measures are based on calculations of
a Jorgensonian rental price (see footnote 6) for major asset classes in each
industry and then aggregating to obtain an overall capital rental price for
each NIPA two-digit industry, which is then mapped to the two-digit SIC
industries in our data. Details on methods and calculation approaches are
found in the BLS Handbook of Methods, chapter 11 (BLS, 1997).
4. Computer Capital (CII Data-Set Definition)
Total market value of all equipment tracked by CII for the firm at all
sites. Market valuation is performed by a proprietary algorithm developed
by CII that takes into account current true rental prices and machine
configurations in determining an estimate. This value is deflated by the
BEA price series for computer capital (BEA, 2001).
5. Computer Capital (IDG Data-Set Definition)
Composed of mainframe and PC components. The mainframe compo-
nent is based on the IDG survey response to the following question (note:
the IDG survey questions quoted below are from the 1992 survey; the
questions may vary slightly from year to year):
What will be the approximate current value of all major processors,
based on current resale or market value? Include mainframes, minicom-
puters and supercomputers, both owned and leased systems. Do NOT
include personal computers.
The PC component is based on the response to the following question:
What will be the approximate number of personal computers and
terminals installed within your corporation in [year] (including parents
and subsidiaries)? Include laptops, brokerage systems, travel agent
systems and retailing systems in all user departments and IS.
The number of PCs and terminals is then multiplied by an estimated
value. The estimated value of a PC was determined by the average
nominal PC price over 1989–1991 in Berndt and Griliches’s (1990) study
of hedonic prices for computers. The actual figure is $4,447. The value for
terminals is based on the 1989 average (over models) list price for an IBM
3151 terminal of $608 (Pelaia, 1993). These two numbers were weighted
by 58% for PCs and 42% for terminals, which was the average ratio
reported in a separate IDG survey conducted in 1993. The total average
value for a “PC or terminal” was computed to be $2,835 (nominal). This
nominal value was assumed each year, and inflated by the same deflator as
for mainframes: the BEA price series for computer capital (BEA, 2001).
6. Labor Expense
Labor expense was either taken directly from Compustat (item 42,
Labor and Related Expenses) or calculated as a sector-average labor cost
per employee multiplied by total employees (Compustat item 29, Employ-
ees), and deflated by the price index for total compensation (Council of
Economic Advisors, 1996).
The average sector labor cost is computed using annual sector-level
wage data (salary plus benefits) from the BLS from 1987 to 1994. We
assume a 2040-hour work year to arrive at an annual salary. For compa-
rability, if the labor figure on Compustat is reported as being without
benefits (labor expense footnote), we multiply actual labor costs by the
ratio of total compensation to salary.
7. Employees
The number of employees was taken directly from Compustat (item 29,
Employees). No adjustments were made to this figure.
8. Materials
Materials were calculated by subtracting undeflated labor expenses
(calculated above) from total expense and deflating by the two-digit
industry deflator for output. Total expense was computed as the difference
between Operating Income Before Depreciation (Compustat item 13), and
Sales (Net) (Compustat item 12).
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9. Value Added
Computed from deflated sales (as calculated above) less deflated
materials.
Appendix B
Reconciling Firm and Industry Productivity Estimates in the
Presence of Unobserved Output
In the main text, we argue that firm-level data may be better able to
capture intangible benefits that arise from computer use to the extent that
it is due to firm-specific investments, whereas these benefits may be
missed in industry-level analyses due to aggregation error. This section
presents a formal treatment of that argument.
Consider a single input production function in which a firm produces
output by using computers—this is an assumption of separability and is
made for convenience in this discussion. Without further loss of general-
ity, we assume that this function is linear in some measure of computers
(C) and output (O), normalized to mean 0 for the sample, plus a
conventional error term (i.i.d., mean 0): O  C 	 . Assume we have
observations on multiple firms (N, indexed by n  1, . . . , N), in M
industries (indexed by m  1, . . . , M).
Let output and computer inputs for each firm comprise a component
common across a particular industry (Om, Cm) and a firm-specific com-
ponent (o, c). These firm-specific components are assumed to be i.i.d.
across firms, to have mean 0, and to be uncorrelated with the industry
effects, but may have a nonzero correlation within firms. These firm-
specific components represent unique IT investments in the firm and the
private benefits firms receive from these investments.21 Thus,
O  Om  o,
C  Cm  c.
Note that we have suppressed the firm and industry subscripts except
where necessary for clarity.
We consider two OLS estimators of the production relationship: one in
firm-level data (a data set with M  N observations), and an alternative
industry-aggregated data set (a data set with M observations representing
the industry mean on each Om and Cm). The OLS estimator of the
productivity term in firm level data is thus
ˆfirm 
covOm, Cm covc, c
varCm varc
.
The equivalent industry-level estimate is
ˆindustry 
covOm, Cm
1
N 2 cov
n
c, 
n
0
varCm  1N 2 
n
c

covOm, Cm
1
N cov
c
, o
varCm
1
N var
c
.
We are interested in the conditions under which the industry-level estimate
is less than the firm-level estimate (ˆindustry  ˆfirm). Substituting the
equations above and rewriting slightly, we get a condition (assuming that
computers have a nonnegative effect on output in these manipulations)
varCm varc
varCm 1/N varc

covOm, Cm covc, o
covOm, Cm 1/N covc, o
.
If we note that (1/N)var(c)  (1/N)cov(c, o), the inequality is
preserved after deleting the right-hand terms in the denominators, al-
though this will tend to understate the differences in elasticity estimates
(in the correct direction for our argument).22 Collecting terms yields
1 
varc
varCm
 1
covc, o
covOm, Cm
,
or
covOm, Cm
varCm

covc, c
varc
.
The left-hand side is simply the regression coefficient for the industry-
specific components alone (Om  ind-onlyCm 	 ), and the right-hand
side is an analogous regression on the firm-specific components only
(o  firm-onlyc 	 ).
There are two implications of this equation:
1. Whenever the marginal product of the firm-specific component of
computer investment exceeds the marginal product of the industry
component, industry-level data will understate the benefits of com-
puters.
2. If the data have the industry-specific effects removed (as by
differencing or industry dummy variables in the regression), then a
positive coefficient on IT is evidence of an incremental firm-
specific benefit of computers.
21 One type of private benefit that this formulation captures is errors in
firm-specific price deflators—if a firm earns greater revenues for the same
level of “physical” output due to unmeasured product quality, it will
appear as additional output when revenue is deflated by a common
industry deflator and is at least partially captured by o.
22 A sufficient condition is that the firm-specific component of computer
investment exhibits nonincreasing returns to scale. If N is large, these
terms can also be dropped.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS808
